

# **Millennium Development Goal 8 – indicators for international human rights obligations?**

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## **Millennium Development Goal 8 – can it be an accountability framework for international human rights obligations?**

### **INTRODUCTION**

The idea that human solidarity transcends national boundaries and extends to all people of the world is expressed in key human rights documents<sup>2</sup> from the UN Charter<sup>3</sup> to the

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<sup>1</sup> This paper is based on work commissioned by the High Level Task Force on the Right to Development (E/CN.4/2005/WG.18/TF/CRP.2 8 November 2005) for its Second Meeting held in Geneva in November 2005, agenda item 5. The paper was originally published in the *Human Rights Quarterly* 28.4; some minor revisions have been made.

Universal Declaration on Human Rights<sup>4</sup> to the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights<sup>5</sup>. And the principle that states have international obligations arising from solidarity is stated in these and several other documents, notably in the Declaration on the Right to Development<sup>6</sup>, and in the 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action.<sup>7</sup> Yet this cherished idea has not developed beyond a statement of principle, neither in concept nor international human rights law. Not much work has been done to define these obligations over the last decades. No clear body of norms and standards has emerged. Several UN legal instruments refer to international cooperation but essentially restate the principle set out in the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. No formal procedures exist to hold states accountable for their international responsibilities. In fact, the recent review by Dos Santos for the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights concludes, this concept is a broad area that has not been analysed adequately.<sup>8</sup>

The principles of human rights obligations have barely had any influence on the thinking of states, scholars and advocates in formulating international development cooperation policies. Even the most ardent advocates of international solidarity in the fight against global poverty invoke moral compulsion, not international state obligation, as the reason why rich countries should make greater efforts. And if human rights are invoked in their discourse, it is merely to disparage extreme poverty as a denial of human dignity,

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<sup>2</sup> See Rui Baltazar Dos Santos Alves, 'Human rights and international solidarity'. Working paper submitted to the Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights. Fifty-sixth session. ECOSOC E/CN.f/Sub.2/2004/43. 15 June, 2004.

<sup>3</sup> "to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social achievement of the economic and social advancement of all people" (Preamble); "to achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights..." (Article 1)

<sup>4</sup> 'everyone is entitled to realization, through national effort and international cooperation ...' (article 22)

<sup>5</sup> States undertake to act 'individually and through international assistance and cooperation...to progressively achieve....' (Article 2)

<sup>6</sup> 'States have a duty to cooperate with each other in ensuring development and removing obstacles to development' (Article 3); 'States have a duty to take steps, individually and collectively, to formulate international development policies with a view to facilitating the full realization of the right to development' (Article 4)

<sup>7</sup> 'States have a duty to cooperate with each other in ensuring development...' (article 3); 'States have a duty to take steps, individually and collectively, to formulate international development policies with a view to facilitating the full realization of the right to development' (article 4)

<sup>8</sup>Op cit.

stopping short of evoking the correlate duties and responsibilities of states and other actors to do their utmost to help achieve realization of rights. This misses the essential value added of human rights to development policy, namely the framework of obligations and accountability to what are otherwise aspirational objectives. At the same time, the growing literature and programmes promoting the ‘rights based approach to development’ focuses on national policy and has done little to address the international dimension of state obligations. Conceptually, the idea of development cooperation is still rooted in the logic of charity, rather than the logic of shared responsibilities in a global community<sup>9</sup>.

The purpose of this paper is to examine Goal 8 of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the internationally agreed commitment to stronger international partnership for development, as a potential tool for filling the gap between principle and policy. Goal 8 is arguably the most significant development since the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights because it takes the idea of international state obligations beyond a statement of principle to list specific policy areas of required action - trade, aid, debt relief and technology transfer. Moreover, Goal 8 is part of an internationally agreed mechanism of review and accountability.

The eight MDGs including their 18 targets and 48 indicators (see annexes 2)<sup>10</sup> emanate from the Millennium Declaration adopted at the 2000 UN Millennium Summit. Heads of state and government gathered in record numbers to define a common vision for the 21<sup>st</sup> century. With all nations of the world present, they committed their nations to work together, and make stronger efforts for global peace, human rights, democracy, good governance, environmental sustainability and poverty eradication.<sup>11</sup> Although there is

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<sup>9</sup> See further literature on this issue, for example by Margot Salomon in 2010, “Global Economic Policy and Human Rights: Three Sites of Disconnection”, Carnegie Ethics Online [http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/resources/ethics\\_online/0043.html/res/id=sa\\_File1/Global\\_Economic\\_Policy\\_and\\_Human\\_Rights.pdf](http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/resources/ethics_online/0043.html/res/id=sa_File1/Global_Economic_Policy_and_Human_Rights.pdf) (accessed April 10, 2011)

<sup>10</sup> The list of targets and indicators was revised in 2005 with the addition of several new targets and indicators.

<sup>11</sup> The Declaration articulated the objectives reflected in the MDGs, while the list of goals, targets and indicators is contained in the Roadmap document of 2001.

more to the Right to Development than the MDGs,<sup>12</sup> these goals overlap with many important human rights. Mobilization of development efforts to implement the MDGs are complementary and can take the agenda forward. Moreover, key human rights principles are reflected in the Millennium Declaration, and in the resolution adopted by the 2010 Summit that reviewed progress and reaffirmed the 2000 commitments<sup>13</sup>.

The MDGs are unique in their ambition and scope, but also in two other ways. First, they set quantifiable targets with a timetable for achievement and indicators to monitor implementation. In the decade since the Millennium Summit, the international community has adopted MDGs as a common set of priorities and a common yardstick for measuring progress. A global monitoring process has been put in place the UN General Assembly reviews global progress annually and held special high level review sessions in 2005 and in 2010, while regional and country reports are also prepared and reviewed. A critical part of this follow up process was the agreement on the Monterrey Consensus adopted at the 2002 UN Conference on Financing for Development. The consensus sets out a framework for international cooperation by identifying key issues, policy priorities, and principles regarding respective roles of national governments, donors and other actors. These Monterrey commitments were specifically reaffirmed by the Summit held in 2010<sup>14</sup>.

MDGs are also unique in their explicit recognition that the Goals could not be achieved by national efforts alone, but would require international cooperation. So while goals 1 –

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<sup>12</sup> The 7 MDGs do not include all relevant priorities of the right to development. There are several notable gaps when considering the substantive content of the right to development. First, they miss out several important development objectives. For example, only equality in schooling is mentioned as a relevant indicator together with gender equality, leaving out all other important areas such as employment, political participation to name just two. Second, the goals do not refer at all to the right to a process development that is transparent, participatory, equitable, and in which rule of law and good governance are practiced. Third, the MDGs miss the equity dimension of the right to development. The targets and indicators all refer to national averages without attention to redressing discrimination that results in exclusion and inequalities.

However, we should not interpret from this that MDGs have no relevance for human rights. The MDGs are benchmarks of progress and the seven goals do not necessarily claim to represent a comprehensive list of all important development objectives. Moreover, they are indicators of progress and are not intended to be a coherent development strategy nor a new development paradigm.

<sup>13</sup> United Nations 2010, A/RES/65/1, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly, *Keeping the promise: united to achieve the Millennium Development Goals*

<sup>14</sup> *ibid*

7 set benchmarks for evaluating progress with respect to income poverty, hunger, primary schooling, gender inequality, child and maternal mortality, HIV/AIDS and other major diseases and environmental degradation, goal 8 sets out action to be taken by rich countries, including action on trade, debt, technology transfer and aid. MDG-8 can thus be considered to provide a framework for assessing accountability of rich countries.

Thus Goal 8 has the potential to be used as a tool of accountability, taking the principle of international solidarity beyond an abstract concept to a concrete policy that is consequential to the actions of states. The aim of this paper is to analyze whether the current list of goal 8 targets and indicators capture the essential elements of international responsibilities for development. To answer this question requires first asking what targets and indicators should measure, what constitutes progress and regress. This in turn requires clarifying the concept of human rights, what constitutes international obligations, and what are the substantive policy priorities.

#### **CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING PROGRESS IN REALIZATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS**

How should progress in human rights realization be assessed? What are the key elements that define progress? Human rights is a complex concept with multiple dimensions; securing human rights requires progress on multiple fronts. Each of these facets needs to be captured in indicators to assess progress.

Consider the concept of the right to development. The right to development is not the same as development. It is not just about improvement in the economy or in social conditions such as schooling. It is also not the same as 'human development', the expansion of capabilities and freedoms that individuals have to lead lives they value. As both Nussbaum and Sen have written, capabilities and human rights are closely related

concepts<sup>15</sup>. They share a common commitment to freedom and justice as central political objectives<sup>16</sup>. So Nussbaum remarks “The two approaches (one being a species of the other<sup>17</sup>) should march forward as allies in the combat against an exclusive focus on economic growth and for an approach to development that focuses on people’s real needs and urgent entitlements.”<sup>18</sup> Yet as they point out, capabilities and rights are distinct concepts, each with a distinct theory, even if they are complementary.<sup>19</sup> The right to development is a much more complex concept than development in many ways. Although human development and human rights may overlap in defining essential entitlements as important social objectives, the concept of rights emphasizes the obligations that are correlative to the entitlements. Human rights define obligations of the duty bearers and the need to put in place social arrangements to ensure people can enjoy their rights and realize their human dignity and freedoms.

Economists often argue that human rights are incorporated in development policies when these policies promote equitable economic growth and social development. This position misses the essence of the human rights concept, namely that rights carry correlative obligations on individuals and institutions, particularly the state. The concept of human rights is concerned with how these obligations have been dispensed to create social arrangements so that people can realize their rights. The concept goes further and is concerned with obligations of ‘conduct’ as well as ‘result’, and whether conduct that is true to principles of non-discrimination, participation, adequate progress, and remedy. The value added of human rights to development is therefore the concern with the accountability of states for putting in place adequate institutions, norms and processes.

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<sup>15</sup> See review of this literature in the special issue of the *Journal of Human Rights and Capabilities*, particularly Vizard, Polly, Sakiko Fukuda-Parr and Diane Elson, (2011) ‘Introduction: The Capability Approach and Human Rights’ *Journal of Human Rights and Capabilities* 12:1 pp 1-22

<sup>16</sup> See Nussbaum, 2000, *Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press; (2003) ‘Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements’, *Feminist Economics*, 9:2-3, 33-59; (2011), ‘Capabilities, Entitlements, Rights: Supplementation and Critique’ *Journal of Human Development and Capabilities*, 12:1, 23-37. See Sen (1982) ‘Rights and Agency’, *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 11:1, 3-39; (2005) ‘Human Rights and Capabilities’, *Journal of Human Development* 6:2, 151-166

<sup>17</sup> She conceptualizes capabilities as a species of rights.

<sup>18</sup> Nussbaum (2011) op cit.p.37

<sup>19</sup> Nussbaum argues that capabilities help clarify the theory of rights. See Nussbaum (2011) op cit.

Another way of approaching this concept is to contrast human rights with development aspirations; human rights are claims that are to be enforced, for which other - duty bearers - are to be held accountable. To evaluate progress in human rights requires an assessment of the conduct of duty bearers in putting in place the appropriate social arrangements.

***Dimensions of human rights and implications for assessing international obligations under Goal 8***

The realization of human rights needs to progress along multiple dimensions on different fronts.

*Two areas of outcomes: the condition in peoples' lives and the social arrangements being put in place* - To assess human rights, we are concerned with progress not only in the condition of peoples lives, but also in the social arrangements that are in place. Much of work on monitoring human rights focuses on documenting violations of rights by monitoring the condition of people's lives. These make up two quite distinct strands of work on human rights measurement. Lack of consensus in the work on indicators arises from the focus on one or the other priority. (Raworth 2001) But progress needs to be assessed in both areas and indicators are needed in both.

The implication for goal 8 is that indicators should focus on state conduct – on whether adequate public policies are in place – rather than on human outcomes.

*Several actors* - many actors in society in addition to the state influence the condition of human lives and therefore have human rights obligations. The state has the primary responsibility for securing peoples rights, but many other actors such as the media, civil society organizations, private companies, the household, and individuals also have a role. In the market economy, the conduct of private companies is a significant factor and that conduct cannot be entirely controlled by the state. In an increasingly globalized world, global actors such as the international organizations and global corporations have

considerable influence, and are beyond the reach of any individual state to regulate. All these actors are duty bearers.

The implication for goal 8 is that international responsibilities reside not only with the state but also with other globally powerful organizations, notably corporations, media and NGO networks. States also have an obligation to ensure that these other actors do not violate human rights. International cooperation is needed when actors are global such as global corporations.

*Several key characteristics of process* – it is not only the human condition but social processes in which people participate that are part of human rights. The right to development is conceptualized as a right to a process. The key features of the process include participation, equality, transparency, accountability, non-discrimination, and remedy. To illustrate, what matters therefore in the realization of the right to development is not just raising school enrolment rates, but achieving greater equality in schooling, reducing disparities among population groups, addressing obstacles such as language for marginalized groups. There must also be a process put in place for accountability and remedy in the case of violation.

The implication for goal 8 is that the question of participation of poor and weak countries in international decision making processes that affect their development is an important concern.

*Benchmarking progressive realization* – it has long been recognized that the pace of progress in realizing rights depends on the context; obstacles are specific to each country and point of time as a result of history. Progress cannot be assessed by a uniform standard internationally. What is important is for each country to make the maximum effort; to monitor these efforts requires setting realistic benchmarks.

The implication for goal 8 is that partnership targets should also take account of these different needs and be disaggregated, recognizing that some countries face larger



obstacles and can be expected to accomplish less. Partnership obligations would vary from one group of countries to another.

## **STRUCTURING INDICATORS FOR ASSESSING STATE CONDUCT**

Over the last decade, much work has been done on conceptualizing human rights measurement methodologies.<sup>20</sup> Some useful approaches have been developed to structure indicators into sets that capture diverse dimensions and objectives. This paper draws particularly on the framework proposed in the *Human Development Report 2000*<sup>21</sup> structured by seven aspects of state conduct. This includes identifying the scope of state conduct in three categories of obligations to respect, protect and fulfill human rights; and identifying four key principles of process, namely non-discrimination, participation, adequate progress and remedy.<sup>22</sup> This framework is consistent with the framework proposed by the Special Rapporteur on the right to health, Paul Hunt and the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) that use 3 categories of indicators: outcome, process and structure.<sup>23</sup>

### **Scope of state conduct: policies to respect, protect and fulfil**

The ‘Maastricht principles’ have come to be widely used in defining the scope of state responsibility in the national context in three dimensions - to respect, to protect and to fulfill. The same principles can be usefully applied in conceptualizing the scope of

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<sup>20</sup> See: Malhotra, Rajeev and Nicolas Fasel. 2005. Quantitative Human Rights Indicators – a survey of major initiatives. Mimeo; Fukuda-Parr, Sakiko (2011) ‘The Metrics of Human Rights: Complementarities of the Human Development and Capabilities Approach’ *Journal of Human Rights and Capabilities* 12:1, pp. 7-:89.

<sup>21</sup> UNDP, 2000. *Human Development Report 2000: Human rights and human development*. New York. Oxford University Press

<sup>22</sup> The work of Kate Raworth is acknowledged as a main author of chapter 5 of this report and developing the conceptual framework. See also Raworth 2001.

<sup>23</sup> See *Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, Mr. Paul Hunt*, 3 March 2006, E/CN.4/2006/48, Annex; Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on indicators for monitoring compliance with international human rights instruments: a conceptual and methodological framework (HRI/MC/2006/7, 11 May 2006); Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on Indicators for Promoting and Monitoring Implementation of Human Rights (HRMI/MC/2008/3, 6 June 2008). A/58/427 submitted to the General Assembly fifty eighth session, agenda item 117(c) 10 October, 2003.

international obligations.<sup>24</sup> This can be illustrated by drawing examples from national state obligations for education, and international obligations in the use of flexibilities that are built into the WTO Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) to extend access to patented medicines during a public health emergency.<sup>25</sup>

*To respect* – refers to not standing in the way of people’s pursuit of their rights. An example in the national context would be to not restrict access to schools by minority populations. In the international context, an example would be refraining from obstructing a country pursuing the use of flexibilities in the TRIPS agreement to protect public health. Several years ago, a group of multinationals took the South African government to court over this issue. Their home governments could have refrained from backing the multinationals position, considering that HIV/AIDS affects over a fifth of the of the country’s adult population.<sup>26</sup>

*To protect* – refers to preventing other actors from violating human rights. An example in the national context would be to intervene when parents refuse to let girls attend school. An example in the international context would be to take measures to encourage multinationals producing HIV/AIDS retrovirals to refrain from standing in the way of using compulsory licensing to allow generic production of the drugs.

*To fulfill* - refers to taking measures that assist in the realization of rights. In the national context an example would be building schools. At the international level, an example

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<sup>24</sup> The intention here is to use these principles to develop a conceptual framework for identifying international obligation, not to make a legal argument.

<sup>25</sup> Medicines under patent are expensive as compared with generics, or in short supply. While the TRIPS agreement requires WTO member countries to put in place a system of intellectual property, they also include provisions to ensure that patents do not stand in the way of public health and other critical issues of human well being. These provisions include in particular, compulsory licensing – allowing companies to produce without a license – the use of which has been hotly contested in recent years. See discussion of human rights obligations related to TRIPS in the addendum report on the Mission to the WTO by the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health . E/CN.4/2004/49/Add.1 Commission on Human Rights March 2004

<sup>26</sup> 21.5% of population aged 15 to 49. Source: UNDP. 2005. *Human Development Report*

would be investing in vaccines for HIV/AIDS that are urgently needed to stem the spread of this pandemic, especially in poor countries.

**Key human rights principles as policy goals – non-discrimination, participation, adequate progress, and effective remedy.**

Cutting through all these outcomes and processes are key human rights principles of non-discrimination, participation, adequate progress and remedy.

*Non-discrimination* – Equitable treatment of all and equal achievement of all in the realization of human rights is a central policy goal. Disparities in the human condition can reveal policy discrimination. In the national context, minority groups may have lower educational achievements reflecting lower spending from public budgets. In the international context, non-discrimination is an important issue in trade policy. Market access for developing countries may be restricted by higher tariffs or subsidies to domestic production. Policies aimed at achieving greater equality imply greater priority to improvement of the most deprived and excluded.

There are significant implications of this principle for goal 8. Numerous discriminatory rules exist in the international trading system, in rules and institutional procedures. It is arguably a matter of human rights obligation on the part of rich countries to dismantle tariffs on developing country exports and subsidies on farm products that compete with developing country exports.

*Participation* – a key principle in the right to development as a right to a process is the ability to participate in making decisions that affect one's life. Participation is secured only when decision making is democratic, where institutions are in place that ensure voices of people to be heard, transparency of government decision making, and procedures for accountability.

An important implication for goal 8 is the human rights obligation of all countries, especially the powerful ones, to ensure that voices of developing countries be heard in the decision making processes such as in multilateral trade negotiations.

*Adequate progress* – the realization of rights depends on the context. Progress has to be assessed in view of the obstacles in the way which are a result of history. Intermediate targets and benchmarks need to be set. In the national context, this would imply, for example, achieving a consensus between people and government as to how much, for instance, school enrolment rate should be raised each year. In the international context, a similar process would be for donors and government to agree on a framework. The special rapporteur on the right to development has therefore proposed compacts between developing countries and partners.

An important implication for goal 8 is that in fact, the MDGs constitute a framework of benchmarking for adequate progress. MDGs set an ambitious targets requiring faster progress; , MDG monitoring reports published by the UN, the World Bank and other organizations<sup>27</sup> consistently conclude that at rates achieved over the last decade, only a handful of countries – mostly in Asia and Latin America – would achieve the goals by 2015, most goals would be missed globally and in most countries of Africa, and most of the poorest countries whether categorized as LDCs, low income or low human development. MDGs are a claim for international state conduct to do much more.

*Remedy* – states have the obligation to put in place procedures for remedy of violation, and for holding responsible parties accountable. In the national context, procedures exist for legal and administrative recourse, and the effectiveness of these procedures can be monitored. In the international context, such procedures are exceptional. The WTO dispute settlement procedure is one of them. Note that this is an exception; enforcement mechanisms at the international level rely on peer pressure, naming and shaming, with no recourse to punitive measures except for sanctions against states, and military intervention justified as ‘Responsibility to Protect’.

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<sup>27</sup> See for example, UN’s annual *MDG Report* and World Bank’s annual *Global Monitoring Report*

## THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS

How should international obligations be defined? How has the case been made? One frequently used argument is the existence of mass poverty in poor countries and the inequalities in the world. Some argue that these inequalities are the result of entrenched structural injustices, rooted in history and reflecting the huge asymmetries in economic and political power among countries. However, these are not sufficient reasons for international responsibility since it is widely agreed among both governments and human rights scholars that the primary responsibility for human rights and eradication of poverty reside at the national level. This principle is also entrenched in UN human rights documents. Indeed, most rich country governments insist on this point and have been reluctant to embrace the notion of international obligations in UN fora and documents because the limits of national responsibility and international responsibility are ambiguous. Thus, international obligations are not a substitute for national responsibility. International action, however, is indispensable for addressing obstacles that are beyond the capacity of national governments to tackle on their own.

### *Three categories of obstacles beyond the reach of national action*

It is often thought that international support for development is essentially about transferring resources – a claim to a hand out. The logic of human rights is not an entitlement to a handout or charity. The entitlement is to social arrangements that would secure a person's rights by making that possible. For sure, international cooperation is needed because developing countries cannot raise adequate resources on their own, but there are two other obstacles that developing countries cannot address on their own. One is international policies and the other is systemic asymmetry in global governance.

*Resource constraints* - The first obstacle is lack of financial and human resources. There is little argument over the fact that developing countries need additional resources beyond what domestic savings and borrowing can mobilize. There is also wide agreement that

achieving MDGs would require substantial additional resources since at current pace of development, most of the low income/low human development countries would miss the 2015 targets. Additional resources can come from better national policies for domestic resource mobilization but must also come from development aid, debt relief, private investment flows and access to private capital markets.

*International policies* – the second obstacle concerns constraints that arise from the international policy environment. For example, most developing countries are highly dependent on primary commodities for their foreign exchange earnings, and face wildly fluctuating prices. They also face ‘tariff escalation’ also dubbed ‘development tax’, where developed countries impose higher tariffs on processed goods such as tinned tomatoes compared with unprocessed goods such as tomatoes. These and other issues have been identified as elements of the ‘development agenda’ of the Doha round of trade negotiations<sup>28</sup>. A single country cannot address these problems on its own; international action is needed to set up schemes to stabilize resource flows in the face of commodity price fluctuations, or to reform unfavourable trade rules. In fact, it is the need for an ‘enabling international economic environment’ that drove developing countries to advocate for recognizing the right to development in the 1970s and 1980s.<sup>29</sup> In today’s context, several other critical issues are evident, such as global warming and other environmental pressures, the need to invest in technology for poor people such as medicines for ‘neglected diseases’, low cost clean energy, higher performing varieties of crops of poorest farmers; human trafficking and other international criminal activity.

*Systemic asymmetry in global governance* – the third obstacle concerns systemic weaknesses in global institutions and processes. An important issue today relates to the international financial architecture and its ability to monitor and prevent financial crises. Another major issue is the inadequate participation of developing countries in international decision making. This is related to the democratic deficit in global

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<sup>28</sup> The round of multilateral trade negotiations launched in 2001 that contains a number of issues of priority concern to the developing countries.

<sup>29</sup> Commission on Human Rights. E/CN.4/2000/WG.18/CRP.1. September 2000. Report of the Independent Expert on the Right to Development, Dr. Arjun Sengupta.

governance, and the lack of transparency and broad participation in institutional structures and decision making processes. The most significant concerns have been raised with respect to agreements on norms and standards in trade and finance. For example, developing countries have weak bargaining power in WTO multilateral trade negotiations which result in trade rules that favour the interests of rich and powerful countries. Developing country representation is also weak in other institutions such as the World Bank, IMF and the Basel Committee. Not only is their voice constrained due to lack of financial and technical resources and capacity, asymmetries are institutionalized in decision making structures and processes, such as in the voting structures of the World Bank and IMF where votes are allocated by share holdings rather than on the basis of equal votes for each member country.

### ***Assigning responsibility for violation – Imperfect obligations***

State conduct is about state policy and action, whether it is budget allocations, regulation, or institutional procedures. There is intrinsic difficulty in identifying the contents of policies and actions that meet state obligations since there is no indisputable consensus on the causal impact of policy on human well being. There are always controversies about data, methodology, and analysis over policy choices. For example, human rights activists have often argued that ‘structural adjustment programmes’ have resulted in unemployment, declines in educational enrolment, and had other adverse impacts on the realization of the right to development. But these policy consequences depend on the specific context, and the causal links are vigorously contested among economists. Many economists argue that these policy packages have had positive effects on employment, education and other aspects of development.

Moreover, there are multiple factors and actors behind any given outcome that makes attributing responsibility for human rights violations extremely difficult. So, for example, if a girl is not in school, is it because the parents oppose the education of girls? Is it the community that has not ensured that the school is safe? Is it the Ministry of

education that has mismanaged its budget? Is it the Ministry of Finance that controls the national budget? Or is it the IMF that insisted that expenditure cuts are necessary to restore macroeconomic balance?

While it is clear that it is not possible to ascribe exact responsibility for a human rights failure to an international actor, it does not follow that there are no obligations. There are obstacles that an international actor can address that a national government, community, or parent is not able to. As Amartya Sen has argued, obligations for helping realization of a right may not be precisely attributable, but are obligations nonetheless. These should then be considered ‘imperfect obligations’.<sup>30</sup>

These imperfect obligations may be particularly difficult to pin down in a legal framework. But they can be agreed among stakeholders in a politically negotiated consensus. While there will always be a rich diversity of analyses, and disagreements among scholars, policy makers can draw on a body of social science knowledge on which there is strong consensus.

One of the most important achievements of the international community since the emergence of the Millennium Declaration in 2000, and the MDGs in 2001 has been the agreement on the ‘Monterrey consensus’<sup>31</sup> in 2002. Adopted at the 2002 UN Conference on Financing for Development held in Monterrey, the consensus identifies key policy priorities thus providing a framework for ‘partnership’ for development, as well as the respective roles and commitments of developing countries to put in place effective governance of the development process, and commitment of donors to take new policy actions in areas of trade, debt, technology transfer, financial markets and private sector flows. This structure echoes the proposal by the former independent expert on the right to development for a compact.

## **GOAL 8, TARGETS AND INDICATORS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ACCOUNTABILITY?**

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<sup>30</sup> UNDP, 2000. Human Development Report 2000.

<sup>31</sup> UN. 2002. Report of the UN Conference on Financing for Development. A/CONF.198.11. New York



The text of Goal 8, its 7 targets and 17 indicators are listed in annex 3. Do these targets and indicators focus on the global priorities and address the most serious obstacles to developing countries? Do these targets capture the key human rights dimensions required of state conduct?

Table 1 compares goal 8 targets and indicators with the priorities over which there is broad consensus. These include the priorities that governments have committed to undertake in the Monterrey consensus, and additional commitments that are identified in policy studies. It is outside the scope of this paper to make an independent assessment of international policy priorities, but we can draw on recent studies commissioned by the UN system that build on the large empirical and analytical literature. In this paper, I review three of the many UN commissioned reports because these are global and most comprehensive: the 2005 report of the UN Millennium Project<sup>32</sup> (MP) led by Professor Sachs that brought together hundreds of specialists from international academia, civil society, government, UN agencies; the 2005 World Economic and Social Survey (WESS) published by the UN Department of Social Economic Affairs<sup>33</sup>, and the 2003 and 2005 editions of the Human Development Report commissioned by UNDP.<sup>34</sup>

This comparison shows that Goal 8 indicators and targets set weak standards for accountability, are narrow in the coverage of the policy agenda, and are inadequate in addressing key human rights principles in each of the three areas where international action is required to supplement domestic efforts: lack of resources, improving the international policy environment and addressing systemic asymmetries in global decision making processes.

### ***Priority 1: Resources – aid, debt, private flows***

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<sup>32</sup> UN, 2005. *Investing in Development: A Practical Plan to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals*. Earthscan. London

<sup>33</sup> UN, 2005. *World Economic and Social Survey*.

<sup>34</sup> UNDP. 2003. *Human Development Report 2003: A compact among nations to end human poverty*. OUP. New York; UNDP. 2005. *Human Development Report 2005: International cooperation at a crossroads*. OUP. New York.

Goal 8 focuses on increasing aid and debt relief, with attention to aid allocation to LDCs and to social services. This is the strongest area of Goal 8 targets and indicators, focusing on official development assistance (ODA) and debt relief. The only quantitative indicator in the goal 8 framework is included in indicator 32 specifies a target of 0.7% of GDP and 0.15% of GDP for LDCs. This has already proven to be an important benchmark in driving policy change in OECD donor countries. Since 2003, aid disbursements have begun to increase, and many donors, especially in the EU, have committed to increase overall aid budgets.

The Monterrey consensus sets a broader agenda that includes issues of exploring new and innovative sources of financing, exploring innovative mechanisms to address debt problems comprehensively; and measures to encourage private capital flows. These issues are also emphasized in the reports reviewed. The reports address the issue of aid allocation with a slightly different emphasis. While Goal 8 includes indicators for allocations to LDCs and to the social sectors, the MP report and HDR2003 argue for aid to be allocated on the basis of a realistic country level analysis of resources required to achieve the MDGs.

Goal 8 indicators and targets raise a number of issues.

First is aid allocation to the countries in greatest need, in order to achieve the MDGs as well as to fulfill human rights according to principles of equality and non-discrimination. The 0.7% GDP target is useful for holding donors accountable to their commitment to increase ODA in the aggregate. MDG8 targets 0.15% of GDP of OECD countries to LDCs out of the aggregate target of 0.7%. LDCs population is about 16% of all developing country population while the 0.15% allocation represents 21% of the aggregate target.

The critical policy issue is ensuring the flow of resources to countries in greatest need, and that these resources are used effectively. Developing countries can be categorised into two groups. A group of countries are on track to meeting MDGs at current rates of

progress. Most of these are middle income countries or countries like China which are experiencing rapid growth and development. They do not require additional aid to achieve the targets. Another group of countries are high priority countries that are far behind and progressing slowly, in some cases in development reversal.

The UN reports propose that aid allocations should be based on country by country estimates of resources needed to achieve the MDGs. MDG benchmarks are more ambitious for the poorest countries; consider the contrast between Burkina Faso and South Africa. Achieving universal primary schooling by 2015 is much more difficult for Burkina Faso where the primary enrolment ration in 2001 was 36% compared with 89% in South Africa. Moreover, Burkina Faso's GDP per capita was \$1120 (PPP) and 61% of its population was living on less than \$1 per day, while South Africa had ten times the resource base with per capita GDP \$11,290 (PPP).<sup>35</sup>

MDGs set targets that take no account of this reality; in fact, they do the reverse since they ask Niger and Chile to achieve universal primary schooling in the same timeframe. The countries with the largest backlog of deprivation tend also to have the largest resource constraints and therefore require the strongest support or 'partnership'. In fact, the Monterrey consensus proposal to favour countries that have good policies also works against the poorest countries because many of them have weak policy capacity. A way has to be found for international cooperation to effectively accelerate progress in these countries.

Second is the need for new approaches to the debt issue. Goal 8 makes an important commitment to 'deal comprehensively with the debt problems'. Indicators focus on outcomes such as proportion of official bilateral HIPC debt cancelled, debt service as a percentage of exports of goods and services and number of countries reaching HIPC decision and completion points. However, Goal 8 indicators and targets do not reflect policy changes that are needed in the design of debt sustainability initiatives. All UN reports reviewed conclude that the HIPC experience has been important but that process

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<sup>35</sup> Data from UNDP, 2010. *Human Development Report*. Oxford University Press. New York.

has been slow, and that deeper relief is required as countries find themselves with unsustainable debt levels not long after benefiting from debt relief.

Third is the need to explore new and sources of financing. Ideas about innovative sources of financing for development have long been discussed. Proposals have been made by independent researchers for several sources of financing but have not been vigorously pursued to date. Some ideas, such as the ‘Tobin tax’ on international capital transactions can raise huge amounts but have support from only a few countries. However the Monterrey consensus has recognized the importance of exploring new sources; in fact it is widely acknowledged, as reflected in the WESS, that there are serious limitations to ODA as a way of meeting financing requirements for development. Political realities of budget constraints and competing priorities as well as the lack of a political constituency in donor countries would, for example, make it difficult to double ODA levels; resources required to meet MDGs are estimated at a ball-park figure of about \$50 billion, or equivalent to doubling of current ODA levels.

### ***Priority 2 – International policies***

Goal 8 makes an important commitment to work towards greater fairness in trade and finance, with a focus on market access. Goal 8 also refers to access to essential medicines and access to new technologies. The targets and indicators however state broad objectives and outcomes without pinpointing concrete policy changes required.

In comparison, the Monterrey consensus contains a broader agenda for policy reform in trade, but also extends to issues of financial markets, commodity price fluctuations, intellectual property, and aid effectiveness. The UN reports reviewed also cover these issues.

First, the Monterrey consensus incorporates commitments to address a wider range of issues restricting market access including agricultural subsidies, tariffs on labor intensive manufactures, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, and the increasingly important issue of migration under liberalizing the movement of persons further to the General

Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) mode 4. This would facilitate migration from developing countries.

Second, the Asian financial crisis demonstrated the risk of financial crises for emerging economies. The Monterrey consensus commits countries to explore policy reforms towards stable flows. The WESS contains detailed analyses and proposals in this area.

Third, commodity price fluctuations are major obstacles to developing countries, most of which are highly dependent on primary commodity exports as a source of foreign exchange earnings. The Monterrey consensus commits countries to do more to mitigate the effects of these fluctuations through implementation of mechanisms such as the IMF Compensatory Financing Facility, as well as through export diversification.

Fourth, intellectual property rights, access to and development of technology are important issues for developing countries. There are growing technological disparities of access and capacity. The Monterrey consensus commits countries to proactive positions with respect to access to medicines and traditional knowledge. Intellectual property rights are important for rich and technologically advanced countries with technology based industries. Developing countries also need help with investments in research and development for technologies that can address enduring problems of poverty such as improved varieties of crops, cures for major diseases, low cost sources of clean energy, etc. Developing countries need access to global technology – such as pharmaceuticals – many of which are patented and priced much higher than generics. Goal 8 refers to this problem and states the objective of expanding access to essential medicines but stops short of identifying concrete action needed such as increasing investments in pro-poor technology, or expanding access to patented medicines through implementation of TRIPS flexibilities such as compulsory licensing.

Goal 8 technology targets focus on information and communications technology (ICT). It is true that developing countries are falling behind in connectivity and the ICT gaps are huge but Goal 8 ignores some of the other major issues requiring action, including

investment in pro-poor technologies and access to pharmaceuticals, and measures to recognize rights to indigenous knowledge.

These issues are also addressed in the UN commissioned reports, which in addition propose some quantitative indicators and deadlines, especially for removal of agricultural subsidies and merchandise tariffs.

Fifth, aid effectiveness requires reforms by both recipient and donor. Important progress has been made in the donor community in identifying and addressing key issues, notably to align priorities to recipient national priorities, to improve harmonization and reduce administrative costs to recipients, both of which contribute to another objective of increasing developing country ownership of the aid process. The March 2005 Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action adopted by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD, and the sets out an important framework for accountability and includes goals and indicators. While the Monterrey consensus and the reports identify these issues, the Goal 8 indicator for aid effectiveness is the proportion of untied aid. This is an important issue, and one that was a central concern of developing countries in earlier decades but one that is of decreasing priority in the twenty first century. .

### ***Priority 3 – Systemic issues***

The Monterrey consensus identifies as a priority, the need to address ‘systemic issues’ to enhance the coherence, governance and consistency of international monetary, financing and trading systems. Two types of problems are widely acknowledged. The first is the growing imbalances in the monetary and financial systems that expose the global economy to shocks – such as the Asian financial crisis - to which developing countries are particularly vulnerable. The second is the asymmetry in decision making and norm setting in international trade and finance.

Analyses in WESS and in the HDRs further identify problems. For example, developing countries are not represented at all in the Basel Committees and the Financial Stability forum. The voting structures of the World Bank and the IMF are heavily weighted to developed countries. WTO rules give equal vote to each country but decision making is by consensus, and consensus making processes are not all open and transparent to all.

This issue of developing country voice and participation in decision making is not included in the Goal 8 agenda.

### ***Other priorities***

*Corporate responsibility* – while the behaviour of private sector actors has always had an important influence on the enjoyment of human rights, such as through impact on working conditions and on the environment, there is no reference in Goal 8 to state responsibilities with respect to corporate conduct. In the age of globalization, the increase of foreign direct investment, and liberalization of the economy, their influence has grown further. An important element of international responsibility of the state is to protect human rights from violations by corporate actors. Goal 8 makes no mention of this role.

### **STRENGTHENING GOAL 8 ACCOUNTABILITY AND IMPLEMENTATION OF RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT**

This detailed review of Goal 8 targets and indicators as a potential framework for monitoring international accountability for the right to development shows that the current formulation of targets and indicators is weak on two accounts. One is that there are no quantitative targets and no timetable for implementation other than the ODA target of 0.7% of GDP. The other is that they state general objectives and desired outcomes but stop short of identifying concrete policy changes that can be monitored, even though governments have committed to specific changes in the Monterrey consensus and in subsequent agreements such as the Paris Declaration.

Goal 8 targets are also narrow; they do not capture the broader and in some sense the more critical policy issues that are included in the Monterrey commitments. The most significant gaps are the commitments to explore new sources of financing, technology issues in TRIPS related to access to medicines and indigenous knowledge, aid effectiveness reforms to enhance ownership by developing countries, and the systemic issues of voice of developing countries in international decision making processes.

Goal 8 does not take on board key principles and priorities of the human rights normative framework. The most glaring omissions concern priority attention to countries in greatest need, protecting human rights against violations by others – notably on the issues of corporate behaviour - and addressing the systemic issue of greater transparency and equality by promoting developing country participation in global governance processes. Overall, Goal 8 emphasizes resource transfer through ODA, arguably the mechanism least compatible with the right to development that emphasizes empowerment of developing countries. Goal 8 is less concrete on changes in the policy environment and even less on systemic issues.

It is beyond the scope of this study to develop a definitive proposal to strengthen goal 8 targets and indicators. To do so would require an in-depth analysis of each of the policy constraints. However, it is possible to identify the key directions for refining goal 8 targets and indicators as a tool for strengthening accountability for international responsibilities:

*Resources (aid, debt)* – targets and indicators should focus on aid allocation and reform of donor practices. Some concrete quantitative or action indicators could be considered:

- increase of a specific amount in concessionary financing received by low human development countries
- agreement before 2015 on new HIPC criteria to provide deeper debt reduction for HIPCs having reached their completion points to ensure sustainability<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> Target proposed in Human Development Report 2003



- agreement before 2015 on new sources of financing development
- agreement before 2015 on reforms in aid practices, to prioritize MDG achievement, to make resource flows more predictable, and to put in place measures to increase ownership by national governments.

*Policy environment* – key priorities are removal of agricultural subsidies, removal of tariffs on merchandise exports of developing countries, commodity price fluctuations, TRIPS flexibilities and indigenous knowledge. Some concrete indicators could be considered:

- as proposed by the MP, set quantitative benchmarks and longer timeframe for progressive removal of barriers to merchandize trade, agricultural export subsidies.
- As proposed by the MP, agree to raise public financing of research and development of technologies in agriculture, health and energy for poverty reduction of \$7 billion by 2015.
- As proposed by WESS, compensation facility for commodity price fluctuations.
- As proposed by the HDR03, agree on introducing protection and remuneration of traditional knowledge in the TRIPS agreement.
- As proposed by HDR05, agree on a commitment to avoid ‘WTO plus’ arrangements in regional agreements.

*Systemic asymmetry in global governance* – although there has been increasing attention to augmenting the voice of developing countries, the international community is far from reaching significant solutions to this problem. Concrete targets should focus particularly on developing country participation in the WTO decision making process where most is at stake.

The 2010 Summit that reviewed MDG progress reaffirmed human rights commitments as part of the Millennium Declaration and MDG agendas. The Outcome document<sup>37</sup> 2010

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<sup>37</sup> UN 2010 *op cit*

outcome document also includes presents more detailed agenda of priority policy measures necessary to achieve the MDGs. Issues of equity within and between countries are included in these proposals but without much emphasis. Paragraph 43 refers to the importance of inclusive and equitable economic growth. Paragraph 53 reaffirms the role of human rights as an integrative part of MDGs. Paragraph 68 calls for more efforts to collect disaggregated data. Paragraphs 70 reiterates the role of international cooperation in achieving growth and poverty reduction and for food security. Paragraph 73 refers to the universal access to services in primary health. The priority agenda for Goal 8 (paragraph 78) does not go beyond the original Millennium Declaration with a few minor exception, namely to explore new innovative finance mechanisms and reaffirming the commitments made in the Monterrey Consensus, the Paris and Accra Declarations on Aid, and to pursue the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations. The issues central to the right to development, namely of discrimination within countries and the asymmetry in the decision making processes on global economic issues are not adequately addressed.

### ***Globalization, global solidarity and international obligations***

Increasing global interdependence has meant that peoples' lives are much more influenced by events that take place outside of the country whether it is the spread of disease, depletion of fishing stocks, or fluctuations in international financial flows. The impact of government policy similarly extends beyond national borders. Developing countries are consequently more dependent on international resources, policy change, and systemic improvement in global governance to accelerate progress in achieving the right to development. The global community needs instruments for making global solidarity work, to strengthen accountability for international responsibilities for global poverty eradication and development.

Goal 8 targets and indicators are operational tools for benchmarking progress in implementing the Millennium Declaration and the international agenda agreed at Monterrey and at the 2005 Summit. These are clearly frameworks for international solidarity and an agenda for promoting the right to development. The Millennium

Declaration squarely starts with the statement of values that underpin the entire declaration – freedom, solidarity, equality, shared responsibility.

Targets and indicators are not meant to substitute for the broader agenda. But the danger is that in policy debates, numbers focus policy makers' attention and have the potential to hijack the agenda. Thus raising ODA to 0.7% of GDP dominates much of the reporting and policy advocacy for MDGs and poverty reduction. Indicators are powerful in driving policy debates. MDG8 presents an important challenge and an opportunity for effectively using targets and indicators to drive implementation of the right to development. It is therefore urgent for the international community to revisit goal 8 targets and indicators, realign them to the central policy challenges identified in the Monterrey consensus, and shift international cooperation from an instrument of charity to an instrument of solidarity.

**Table 1 Goal 8 targets and indicators compared with proposals in Monterrey Consensus and major UN reports.**

<b>Category of policy priorities: development constraints requiring international action.</b>	<b>Priorities in Goal 8 targets and indicators</b>	<b>Additional priorities in Monterrey consensus and subsequent agreements</b>	<b>Additional priorities identified in policy research as per Millennium Project Report (MP), World Economic and Social Survey (WESS 2005), Human Development Reports 2003 and 2005<sup>38</sup></b>
<b>Resources</b>	<p><i>ODA</i> Indicator 32: Raise ODA to 0.7% GNP of OECD countries and 0.15% for LDCs</p> <p>Indicator 33: proportion of ODA to social services.</p> <p>Indicator 34: proportion of ODA that is untied.</p> <p><i>Address the special needs of landlocked countries and small island developing States. (target 14)</i></p> <p>Indicator 35: proportion of ODA for environment in small island states;</p> <p>Indicator 36:</p>	<p><i>ODA</i> Make concrete efforts to increase ODA to 0.7% of GNP and 0.15 to 0.2 % of GNP to LDCs.</p> <p><i>New sources</i> Explore innovative sources of finance e.g. SDR allocations for development.</p> <p><i>Private capital flows</i> Provide support such as export credit, cofinancing, venture capital, risk guarantees, leveraging aid resources, information on investment opportunities, business development services, business fora, finance feasibility studies.</p> <p><i>Debt</i></p>	<p><i>ODA</i></p> <p><i>Aid allocation</i> Aid allocations according to requirements for achieving MDGs. (MP)</p> <p>Allocate more ODA to low income countries. (WESS)</p> <p><i>New sources</i> Innovative sources of financing e.g. international finance facility. (WESS)</p>

<sup>38</sup> Includes points not already in the Monterrey consensus and follow up including the Wrlld Summit.

	<p>proportion of ODA for transport sector in landlocked countries.</p> <p><i>Debt</i> Target 15 - Deal comprehensively with debt problems of developing countries through national and international measures to achieve debt sustainability – indicators 41-44 on debt cancellation, debt service as % of exports, proportion of ODA provided as debt relief, number of countries reaching HIPC decision and completion points.</p>	<p>Speedy, effective and full implementation of the enhanced HIPC facility. Put in place a set of clear principles for management and resolution of financial crises, ensure debt relief does not detract from ODA resources. Explore innovative mechanisms to comprehensively address debt problems.</p>	
<b>Policy environment</b>	<p><i>Trade (Target 12)</i> Develop an open, rule based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial system. Includes a commitment to good governance, development and poverty-reduction – both nationally and internationally.</p> <p>Indicator 37: proportion of exports admitted free of duties and quotas.</p> <p>Indicator 38: average tariffs and quotas on agricultural products,</p>	<p><i>Private financial flows:</i> Measures to sustain sufficient and stable flows – address transparency and information, mitigate excessive volatility. Initiatives to enhance access to financial markets strengthen capacity for risk assessment.</p> <p><i>Trade:</i> Increase market access. Address trade barriers, trade-distorting subsidies and other trade-distorting measures, especially in sectors of special export interest</p>	<p><i>Trade:</i> Set longer-term (for example 2025) quantitative targets for the total removal of barriers to merchandise trade, substantial across the board liberalization of trade in services, and universal enforcement of the principle of reciprocity and non-discrimination. (MP)</p> <p>Before 2015 agree and finance, for HIPCs, a compensatory</p>

	<p>textiles and clothing.</p> <p>Indicator 39: domestic and export agricultural subsidies in OECD countries; Indicator 40: proportion of ODA provided to build trade capacity.</p> <p><i>Target 13: Address the special needs of LDCs including tariffs and quota free access for least developed countries' exports; enhanced programme for HIPC and cancellation of official bilateral debt; more generous ODA for countries committed to poverty reduction.</i></p> <p><i>Access to essential drugs (target 17)</i> Indicator 46: proportion of population with access to affordable essential drugs on a sustainable basis.</p> <p><i>Technology (target 18)</i> Make available benefits of new technologies, especially information and communications. Indicator 47: telephone lines per 1,000 people</p>	<p>including agriculture; abuse of anti-dumping measures; technical barriers and sanitary and phytosanitary measures; trade liberalization in labour intensive manufactures; trade in services. Improve supply competitiveness for low income country exports.</p> <p><i>Intellectual property rights.</i> Implementation and interpretation of TRIPS supportive of public health; protection of traditional knowledge and folklore.</p> <p><i>Commodity price fluctuations and dependence on primary commodity exports –</i> IMF Compensatory Financing Facility. Support export diversification.</p> <p><i>Aid effectiveness</i> Improve aid effectiveness by addressing following issues: harmonization of procedures, alignment with national priorities, national ownership, untying aid, strengthen recipient capacity to manage aid, ODA as leverage to additional financing and trade, south-south</p>	<p>financing facility for external shocks, including collapses in commodity prices. (HDR2003)</p> <p>In the short term, before mid 2005: agriculture - priority effort in agriculture to achieve significant reductions in tariff peaks and escalation, phase out specific duties on low income country exports. A binding commitment to abolish export subsidies and two tier price schemes. Non-agricultural merchandise - reduce tariffs to zero by 2015. Services - liberalize mode 4 of GATS - temporary movement of labour to provide services. Special and differential treatment – set up 'aid for trade fund' to address adjustment costs associated with implementation of Doha reform agenda. Promote export competitiveness – additional aid, especially for investments in agricultural</p>
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	<p>Indicator 48: Personal computers per 1,000 people.</p>	<p>cooperation, and ODA targeting to the poor.</p>	<p>productivity and labour intensive exports in LDCs. (MP, HDR2003, HDR2004, WESS)</p> <p>Commitment to avoid ‘WTO plus’ arrangements in regional trade agreements. (HDR2005)</p> <p><i>Intellectual property</i> By 2015 introduce protection and remuneration of traditional knowledge in the TRIPS agreement. Agree on what countries without sufficient manufacturing capacity can do to protect public health under TRIPS agreement. (HDR2003)</p> <p><i>Regional and global public goods –</i> Aid for overlooked priorities, especially neglected public goods and long term goals such as scientific capacity, environmental management, regional integration and cross-border infrastructure. (MP)</p> <p>Public financing of</p>
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			<p>research by \$7 billion by 2015 of which \$4 billion for public health, \$1 billion for agriculture, \$1 billion for improved energy, and \$1 billion for greater understanding of climate change.</p> <p><i>Security</i> - Reduce threats of violent conflict within countries through aid to post-conflict states, greater transparency in resource management, and cutting flow of small arms. (HDR2005)</p>
Systemic (institutional) asymmetry in global governance		<p>Enhance coherence, governance, and consistency of international monetary, financial and trading systems. Including reform of the international financial architecture; strong coordination of macroeconomic policies among leading industrial countries for global stability and reduced exchange rate volatility; national ownership and needs of the poor; effective and equitable participation of developing countries in the formulation of</p>	<p>Redress global macroeconomic imbalances, and enhance measures to reduce developing country vulnerability to crises such as IMF facilities to compensate for short term shocks. (WESS)</p> <p>Enhance voice and participation of developing countries in international financial decision making, especially Basel Committee and Financial</p>



		<p>financial standards and codes; stronger IMF surveillance to prevent crises.</p> <p>Global governance – broaden the base for decision making and norm setting. IMF and World Bank, WTO, Bank for International Settlements, Base Committees and Financial Stability Forum, and other ad hoc groupings to make efforts to enhance participation of developing and transition countries, and to ensure transparent processes.</p> <p>Strengthen the UN system and other multilateral institutions including stronger coordination among UN agencies and funds with the Bretton Woods institutions.</p> <p>Strengthen international tax cooperation.</p> <p>Finalize a UN convention against corruption including repatriation of illicitly acquired funds and money laundering. Signature and ratification of the UN Convention against Transnational</p>	<p>Stability Forum which have no developing country representation; (WES 2005)</p>
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