Chapter 2
Should global goal setting continue, and how, in the post-2015 era?

Sakiko Fukuda-Parr

2.1 Introduction

The 21st century began with an unprecedented commitment to a new consensus on ending poverty as the central purpose of international development. World leaders from 189 countries, including 147 Heads of State and Government, gathered at the United Nations General Assembly to define the central challenges for the new century. They adopted the Millennium Declaration (UN 2000 A/RES/55/2) which stated their determination to work towards development and poverty eradication, peace and security, environmental conservation, democracy and human rights. They pledged to “spare no effort to free our fellow men, women and children from the abject and dehumanizing conditions of extreme poverty” (paragraph 11). They further emphasized that the global reach of these commitments went beyond their own national borders to people worldwide, notwithstanding the primary responsibility that governments have for their own citizens.

The Declaration was a visionary document that reiterated the shared values of solidarity, equality, dignity and respect for nature as the basis for their consensus and was exceptional for its clear vision and articulation. It was also particularly powerful because it went beyond vision and values and included a concrete action plan by setting ambitious and measurable goals with a clearly defined deadline. One year later, the Secretary-General
published his implementation plan, the Road Map document (A/56/326), which contained, in an annex, a list of goals derived from the Declaration. These were structured and elaborated as 8 goals, 18 targets and 48 indicators and packaged with a catchy new name, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The purpose of this list was to “harmonize reporting on the Millennium Declaration” (p.55, paragraph 1).

The expiration of the MDGs in 2015 raises several questions: should they expire, be renewed with an extended deadline, or be replaced with a new set of global goals?

The objective of this chapter is to argue for the last option. The expiry is an opportunity to correct some of the deficiencies of the MDG approach, and to set new goals that more adequately reflect the equitable growth and human rights-based development strategy set out in the Millennium Declaration. The next section gives a short review of the MDG experience over the decade, highlighting both important contributions and critical issues that have emerged. The third section aims to explain the MDGs as a policy instrument in the context of the political economy of international development cooperation. The fourth section proposes an approach to setting post-2015 goals based on the ethical commitments of the Millennium Declaration. The final section concludes.

2.2 The MDG experience, 2001-2011

The MDGs are global goals. Since the 1960s, such goals have been set at UN conferences to draw attention to important but neglected global priorities (Jolly, 2004). They are, in fact, an important part of agendas set at these gatherings of the world’s countries where common objectives are defined and priority actions enumerated; time-bound and quantitative goals make the commitments concrete, make it possible to monitor implementation and progress, and provide a framework for developing strategies. The essential function of the MDGs is to serve as benchmarks for monitoring the Millennium Declaration. However, there is no consensus on how the MDGs should be used. As later sections of this paper will elaborate, they are frequently interpreted—inappropriately—as planning targets or as normative objectives.

MDGs and development priorities

According to Weiss, Jolly and Emmerij (2009), the MDGs were among the most important United Nations ideas that changed the world. Like most UN
resolutions, the MDGs could have fallen into oblivion within a few weeks or months of their introduction, but they continue to dominate international debates on development. The MDGs have become the standard reference point around which international debates on development revolve. They are used as a proxy to judge progress in tackling global poverty. The UN, the World Bank and numerous other international bodies monitor MDG implementation and issue annual reports with detailed data. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) systematically includes data on MDG targets in their country reports along with key macroeconomic performance indicators. UN meetings to review progress in achieving MDGs have become frequent high-profile political events that are significant for a country’s prestige and international standing. Political leaders make speeches defending policy initiatives with warnings such as: “without such-and-such action the MDGs will not be achieved”. Economists write research papers on macroeconomic policy choices and evaluate them against contributions to achieving MDGs. Local NGOs advocate national budget reforms “to achieve the MDGs”, however critical they may be of these goals, because the MDGs are the accepted standard for evaluating policy. Media reports on poverty refer to the failure to achieve MDGs as a demonstration of pervasive abject poverty. In other words, MDGs have become a convenient shorthand for ending poverty and, to a certain extent, for achieving development.

It is widely acknowledged that the MDGs raised awareness about global poverty as an urgent challenge and a priority for global action. They have helped to maintain development as a priority, not only at the UN, but also in other fora such as meetings of the G-8 and G-20. Moreover, since their introduction in 2001, the MDGs have become increasingly accepted and consolidated as the legitimized framework for debates on international development. Even those who initially opposed them or hesitated to embrace them now use them.\textsuperscript{3} In so doing, MDGs have shaped the international development debates in several ways.

First, the MDGs institutionalized the moral imperative of ending poverty—their broad purpose as a whole or a package—as an international norm (Fukuda-Parr and Hulme, 2011).\textsuperscript{4} Second, the MDGs have come to reshape the consensus understanding of “development” to mean ending poverty. Although ending poverty has been long considered an essential purpose of development—advocated, for example, by World Bank President Robert McNamara in the 1970s—the dominant view had understood development as transforming economic structures and creating capacity for sustainable growth (Fukuda-Parr and
However, as I will explore later in this chapter, this recent reconceptualization of development has also had perverse effects on development policy debates by over-simplifying the challenges involved.

Third, the MDGs have helped define poverty to mean multidimensional deprivation in the lives of people, including such dimensions as education, health, environment, food, employment, housing, and gender equality—or “human poverty”.

Since the 1990s, the question of how poverty should be defined and measured has been a subject of much controversy. Though it is now widely recognized that poverty is a multidimensional phenomenon and a human-centred concern, the most frequently used definition has been based on consumption, and its measurement defined as the money-centric headcount below a threshold level of income.

MDGs in national and international policy

National governments and donor agencies consistently refer to MDGs as an important part of their policy frameworks. What this has meant in practice ranges from rhetorical adoption, such as referring to them in general policy statements, to instrumental adoption, such as using the targets to drive resource allocation and policy shifts. For example, as part of the MDG implementation effort, the UN Millennium project made a major effort to assist Governments with the necessary cost and programme investments to achieve the 2015 targets. In most cases, these estimates were controversial and were not incorporated into national planning, budgeting and resource mobilization processes such as the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, national development plans and budgets. In fact, in a 2008 study (Fukuda-Parr, 2008) I reviewed 22 Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) under implementation and found that they consistently referred to the MDGs as a major national development objective, but not all included timelines or action plans for achieving the targets. Moreover, those that did were selective about which of the 8 goals and 18 targets were incorporated in the papers. While many included income poverty, primary education, child mortality and water goals, other goals (e.g. decent work, food and nutrition, gender equality, environmental sustainability, and global partnerships issues of trade, technology and financing) were consistently neglected. Additionally, many PRSPs adopted a strategy of economic growth and social sector investments without considering distributional challenges. Implicitly, PRSPs have assumed that aggregate national economic growth and social sector expansion would lead to the achievement of the goals through a
process of “trickle down” without acknowledging the considerable evidence that macroeconomic policies may have distributional impacts that can undermine poverty reduction. Only one of the PRSPs reviewed mentioned inequality and gave attention to the most vulnerable.

The same study (Fukuda-Parr, 2008) reviewed policy frameworks of 21 bilateral donors and found all consistently mentioned MDGs as overall objectives. Environmental sustainability, education, health and global diseases as well as income poverty were the goals most cited. Priority was also given to governance, including human rights and democracy, as well as peace and security that are chapters of the Millennium Declaration but were not included in the MDGs.

None of the donors have incorporated the MDGs in their frameworks for allocation of resources and for programming purposes. Nonetheless, there has been a perceptible increase in funding for social sectors and within these

Table 2.1
ODA commitments by DAC donors, 1990-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social infrastructure</td>
<td>19,844</td>
<td>20,231</td>
<td>20,919</td>
<td>34,174</td>
<td>44,333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production sectors</td>
<td>10,322</td>
<td>6,755</td>
<td>4,405</td>
<td>5,997</td>
<td>8,977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,142</td>
<td>2,219</td>
<td>3,042</td>
<td>5,372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General budget support</td>
<td>1,155</td>
<td>1,291</td>
<td>561</td>
<td>1,826</td>
<td>2,365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education total</td>
<td>8,631</td>
<td>7,307</td>
<td>5,522</td>
<td>6,656</td>
<td>9,470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic education</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>775</td>
<td>1,166</td>
<td>1,910</td>
<td>2,510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health total</td>
<td>2,441</td>
<td>2,845</td>
<td>2,385</td>
<td>4,076</td>
<td>5,116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic health</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>1,266</td>
<td>1,329</td>
<td>2,532</td>
<td>2,945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food crop production</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 2.2
ODA allocations of DAC donors to MDG priorities, 1999-2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Per cent of sector allocable ODA</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic social services (MDG indicator 8.2)</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid for trade (MDG indicator 8.9)</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>28.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2.1
Sectoral allocation of ODA commitments, 1990-2010
Millions of constant 2010 US dollars


Figure 2.2
Allocation of ODA commitments to production sectors, 1990-2010
Millions of constant 2010 US dollars

Figure 2.3
Allocation of ODA commitments to health sectors, 1990-2010

Millions of constant 2010 US dollars

- Health total
- Basic health


Figure 2.4
Allocation of ODA commitments to education, 1990-2010

Millions of constant 2010 US dollars

- Education total
- Basic education

sectors to primary basic services (see tables 2.1 and 2.2 and figures 2.1-2.4). ODA for other MDG priorities, notably food production and agriculture, which are important for reducing hunger and malnutrition and for reducing rural poverty, also increased but less markedly. Increased ODA allocation to primary basic services took place at expense of other sectors. The proportion of aid allocated by member countries of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) to basic social services increased from 10.1 per cent in 1999 to 21.0 per cent in 2009 while the proportion of ODA for building trade capacity declined from 38.5 per cent in 2001 to 28.9 per cent in 2009.

The years following the introduction of the MDGs were striking for the ambitious and high-profile political commitments made by the G-8 countries, such as the pledge to double development aid to Africa (or 0.51 per cent of their GNIs) made at the Gleneagles Summit in 2005. However, they have largely not been implemented (United Nations, 2011a: p. 12. figure 3) though a few countries have made significant increases in their support to Africa. Moreover, no significant international poverty initiatives were launched, and the rich countries have not shifted their positions on critical international economic policies including trade, finance, investment and technology transfer. As the title of the United Nations MDG Gap Task Force 2011 report, “The Global Partnership for Development: Time to Deliver”, makes clear, donor countries have fallen far short of implementing their Goal 8 targets for aid, trade, debt and technology (United Nations, 2011a). So far, the only tangible progress in these areas has been the reduction of the debt burden of the poorest countries. Multilateral trade negotiations—the Doha Round, labelled the “development round”—have become deadlocked, largely over differences between developing and developed country positions. Aid commitments have increased in volume, but these trends started before 2000 and have slowed since 2006. Moreover, ODA flows remained at 0.31 per cent of donor GNI in 2010, the levels reached in the 1980’s and far short of the UN target of 0.7 per cent of GNI. There has been substantial reallocation to the Least Developed Countries (LDCs)—from $21 billion in 2000 to $29 billion by 2009 (2009 prices and exchange rates). But this is still only 0.10 per cent of donors’ GNI compared with the UN target for ODA to LDCs of 0.15-0.2 per cent of GNI (United Nations, 2011a: p.10, table 1).

Beyond national governments, the MDGs have spawned numerous responses on the part of local governments, civil society and businesses across the world. For example, in Ecuador, local governments used MDGs
as a framework for establishing priority action plans. In Brazil, the MDGs mobilized the national petroleum company to initiate social projects. The numbers of people participating in the “Stand Up Against Poverty” campaign has mushroomed into millions. There are numerous other examples, though it is difficult to assess the magnitude and scope of these diverse and disparate initiatives.

Surprisingly, the consensus on poverty as a policy priority has not led to fundamental debates about policy alternatives for faster poverty reduction. Over the last half-century, many ideas have marked the evolution of development thought and driven historical shifts in theory and strategies. Some examples include the concept of basic needs in the 1970s, structural adjustment and neoliberal reforms in the 1980s, and human development in the 1990s, all of which brought elements of theoretical ideas with practical policy strategies. However, the consensus on poverty as a priority has not been accompanied by shifts in policy strategies. Despite greater focus on social sector investments to meet basic needs and on social protection, development strategies continued to follow the 1990s approach that emphasized macroeconomic stabilization and liberalization as the priority objective through the application of “Washington Consensus” policies to promote aggregate economic growth through private investments.

To be sure, important studies have examined past policy approaches and there have been many departures from the structural adjustment programmes of the 1980s. Social investments and protection, including initiatives such as conditional cash transfers, have emerged as important priorities. But the core macroeconomic strategies have remained unchallenged. The Washington Consensus policies aimed at macroeconomic stabilization and liberalization have continued to dominate, supplemented only by emphasis on social investments and increased volumes of aid to achieve the targets. New strategies have emerged not from mainstream thinking and advice from the international development community, but from innovation within developing countries that have not been in IMF policy based lending programs. These approaches have included not only alternative growth strategies, but also poverty reduction strategies, particularly in Brazil and several other Latin American countries which have achieved reductions in inequality along with economic growth. What’s more, these policy approaches have been more interventionist in promoting expansionary macroeconomic policies, expanding employment, and raising incomes of the poorest such as targeted conditional cash transfers.
Did the new commitment to ending poverty lead to improved outcomes? It is impossible to attribute outcomes to the MDGs amongst the multitude of factors that have driven poverty and development trends. But the problem remains that while world leaders made commitments to do their utmost, the pace of progress has been too slow and unevenly distributed among countries and goals (tables 2.3 and 2.4).

The United Nations and other international agencies assess progress made against the 2015 targets, focussing on the level of achievement. According to the 2011 UN MDG Progress Report (United Nations, 2011c), globally, the 2015 targets for income poverty (goal 1) and water (goal 7) are on track to be met, while steady progress is being made towards targets for child mortality (goal 4), and global diseases (goal 6). Primary school enrolment has been advancing, but the pace has begun to slow down and the goal of universal enrolment may not be achieved. More alarmingly, there has been either stagnation or regress for some goals and targets. For instance, the proportion of people who are hungry (goal 1) has plateaued at 16 per cent since 2000/2002 and the number of undernourished people grew from 817 million in 1990/92 to 830 million in 2005/2007; employment and decent work (goal 1) have shown a setback in many countries; progress has been slow in gender equality and empowerment, other than in primary education (goal 3), and in reducing maternal mortality (goal 5).

Levels of achievement are not a good measure of whether the MDGs may have resulted in better development progress. Countries have different starting points, and, for many countries, achieving the MDGs may not be feasible even if they were to adopt improved efforts resulting in better performance (Clemens et al., 2007). In another paper (Fukuda-Parr et al., forthcoming), my co-authors and I have argued that the criterion for success should be improvement in performance to be measured by the pace of progress. We proposed a methodology for this criterion and made estimates for 24 MDG indicators.

Our findings were disappointing at the country level, but more encouraging for sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia as regions. We found improved performance by a majority of countries for just 5 of the 24 indicators studied. On the other hand, the majority of sub-Saharan African countries showed improved progress for 16 indicators. At the global level, the pace of progress improved for under-5 mortality rate, measles immunization and gender parity in primary schooling, but not
Table 2.3
Summary of Global and National MDG Progress

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Improvement since 1990?</th>
<th>Distance progressed to global goal (100% = goal attained)</th>
<th>Faster Progress 1990-2000/2000-8</th>
<th>Faster than Historical Patterns?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Global Progress</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undernourishment</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Education</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender Equality*</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child Mortality</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maternal Mortality</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drinking Water</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>National Progress</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Countries Making Progress</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undernourishment</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Education</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender Equality*</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>89/82**</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child Mortality</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maternal Mortality</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drinking Water</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Kenny and Sumner (2011) based on Fukuda-Parr and Greenstein (2010), Leo and Barmeier (2010), World Bank (2011) and estimates by Melamed (2012).

Notes:
* Represents the proportion of developing countries for which the appropriate data is available.
** Gender Equality for primary and secondary education, respectively.
Table 2.4
Global poverty estimates, 1990-2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population poor (%)</th>
<th>People poor (millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>US $1.25 poverty line</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia and Pacific</td>
<td>54.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>60.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe and Central Asia</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>51.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>51.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>57.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>41.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL MINUS CHINA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>US $2 poverty line</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia and Pacific</td>
<td>79.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>84.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe and Central Asia</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>82.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>82.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>76.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>63.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL MINUS CHINA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

for attended births or safe drinking water. For income poverty, the pace improved in all developing regions. South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa—the two regions with the highest concentrations of poverty—showed consistent improvement and performed better than the other regions. In sub-Saharan Africa, progress has been made at a faster rate for all but one indicator for which data are available since the MDGs were introduced. In South Asia, improvements have accelerated for all indicators, except child mortality and child malnutrition. While it is not possible to attribute the improved progress to the MDG initiative, the record of improvement is encouraging.

**The controversies**

The MDGs have generated critical debates among both development practitioners and researchers, particularly when they were initially introduced. The numerous points that have been raised can be categorized into two sets of issues: (i) those that concern the composition of the goals, targets and indicators, and (ii) those that relate to the development and implementation processes.

With respect to the composition of the lists, critics have raised the following issues:

1. *Poorly designed as development goals*: The methodology for setting the goals has been inconsistent and apparently arbitrary (Easterly, 2009; Saith, 2006), the levels set are unrealistic for many countries (Clemens et al., 2007) and biased against countries with low starting points (Clemens et al., 2007; Easterly, 2009; Fukuda-Parr, forthcoming).

2. *Composition is too narrow and excluding important dimensions of development*: The publication of the MDGs led to strong reactions from many constituencies whose agendas were left out, including: reproductive health rights particularly as the Development Assistance Committee (DAC)/IDGs included this agenda; gender inequality that was only reflected in the primary education goal; employment; governance; the macroeconomy and structural change (Chang; Gore); and in more recent years, climate change. In 2005, three new targets and 12 new indicators were added to the list in response to some of these criticisms. Concern for the narrow and unbalanced composition of the targets continues to be raised. While the MDGs
draw on chapter III of the Millennium Declaration, they leave out the objectives of chapters IV (environment), V (human rights, democracy and good governance), VI (protecting the vulnerable) and VII (meeting the special needs of Africa).

iii. Lack of attention to important norms and principles, in particular falling short of human rights standards: The human rights community has been highly critical of the MDGs (Alston, 2004). Although the MDGs overlap with many economic and social human rights, they lack some of the key human rights principles including: concern for the most vulnerable and the marginalized; removing discrimination and respecting the equal rights of all; participation; accountability; and standards for rights that require universal access to services (OHCHR, 2008).

iv. Lack of attention to equality: The MDGs do not reflect important ethical concerns expressed in the Millennium Declaration for the poorest of the poor and the most vulnerable. Similarly, the principles of equality, empowerment and participation have not been adequately reflected (Fukuda-Parr, 2008; Nelson, 2007; Saith, 2006).

v. Unbalanced international political economy: Goal 8 is weak and lacks hard quantitative 2015 targets. It is also narrow in scope. It is a poor reflection of the agendas advocated by developing countries, notably those related to the asymmetric rules of global trade, international investment and finance, the reduced policy space and quality of aid. From the onset, many developing countries were skeptical of the MDGs for fear they would present another set of conditionalities, while imposing a stronger accountability framework for the developed countries.

vi. Distortion of national priorities: From the start, many civil society groups in developing countries expressed dismay with the MDGs for undermining their advocacy and policy dialogue with their governments. For example, some of the goals such as universal primary education took the agenda backwards in countries where the challenge was to improve quality in primary schooling and advance access to secondary education. This led one activist to rename the MDGs as the “Most Distracting Gimmick” (Antrobus, 2001).

Critics have raised a number of issues with respect to the process of formulation and implementation, as follows:
i. **Lack of broad consultation in formulation**: The MDGs were introduced in the 2001 report of the UN Secretary-General, derived from the Millennium Declaration. Both documents built on the outcome documents of the UN development conferences of the 1990s, but the selection of these outcomes for these documents did not involve wide consultations. This led to criticism from civil society organizations (Bissio, 2003) and lukewarm responses from developing country governments.

ii. **Global or national goals?** An important debate has emerged over the applicability of the goals at the country level and remains unresolved. Some have argued that the global goals should be adapted at the national level (Vandemoortele, 2009), while others have held that they should be achieved in each and every country (Sachs, 2005). The Millennium Declaration and subsequent UN official documents leave the question unanswered. In practice, the UN monitoring reports apply the goals to each country, though many countries have also adapted the goals to their national contexts. Applying them at the national level and holding governments accountable is highly problematic, since they impose a one-size-fits-all set of 2015 targets for countries with hugely divergent starting points, constraints, financial resources and capacity (Clemens, 2004; Easterly, 2005; Fukuda-Parr et al., forthcoming).

iii. **Criteria for success and methodology of measuring progress**: The methodology for assessing performance used by official national and international monitoring reports focuses on the level of achievement relative to the target. This method is biased against countries with low starting points. A more appropriate metric would be to focus on the pace of progress as discussed above (Fukuda-Parr, et al. forthcoming). Countries that have committed to doing their utmost should be held to account for making faster progress towards ending poverty. It does not make sense to apply a set of one-size-fits all targets to countries of enormously divergent conditions and means, and to judge their success and failure.

iv. **Aid-centric process**: Development aid has been a major focus of much of the MDG debates and their use. They are applied to developing countries and not to developed countries, and the international monitoring efforts focus on the performance of developing countries, rather than the challenge of poverty worldwide.
Lessons of the MDG experience

The MDGs created a narrative that has raised global awareness of poverty as a compelling moral challenge requiring urgent action. The narrative has become a consensus framework for debate on international development. The MDGs are widely accepted among the main stakeholders, including national governments, donor agencies, international NGOs, and local civil society groups, regardless their views about the MDG relevance as a development strategy. The importance of this new awareness and consensus should not be underestimated considering that the pursuit of development priorities in the globalized and democratically governed world requires the public at large to share commitments to these priorities as ethical imperatives of a common humanity. However, considering the transformative vision for the twenty-first century laid out in the Millennium Declaration, and the strength of the political commitments made there, the evolution of development outcomes and thinking in the decade since 2000 has been disappointing. The MDGs drove attention to poverty as a priority but did not in turn drive transformative strategies and results.

These shortcomings and the controversies point to three important lessons for the future. The first is the need for consensus on how global goals should be used based on a clearer understanding of goal setting as a policy instrument. The controversies about their justification as planning targets and application at the country level reflect an incorrect interpretation of MDGs as economic planning instruments which was not their intended purpose. The MDGs are derived from the Millennium Declaration, which is a normative document that defines how the world should look. It is a result of political negotiations, not a technocratic process of modelling development interventions to guide resource allocations in a manner that is realistic and feasible. Applied to development policymaking, the Declaration offers a framework for evaluating progress and assessing priorities. The 8 goals, 21 targets and 60 indicators, are best interpreted as benchmarks for monitoring implementation, not as hard planning targets. According to UN officials involved in drafting the Millennium Declaration,12 the original idea behind including some quantitative targets in the Declaration was to give concreteness to the development agenda. The MDGs were not intended to apply to each and every country, rather to monitor global progress and to encourage donors and national governments to make greater efforts to end poverty (Fukuda-Parr and others, forthcoming). It is not surprising that they are considered as overambitious for many countries since they did not originate from a technocratic planning process based on consideration...
of economic variables necessary for achievement of social and economic outcomes. The same misinterpretation has led to confusion about whether the MDGs should be applied at the country level, and to measuring success by the metric of shortfall in achievement rather than pace of progress.

Second, a broader set of goals is needed to more adequately reflect the essence of the Millennium Declaration which embodied a global consensus on the need for globalisation to be a positive force for improving human well-being of all people and countries. It envisioned a transformative agenda that was multidimensional, aiming at development that is sustainable and equitable, encompassing not only growth and poverty reduction but also security, democracy and human rights. The MDG experience demonstrates the power of numbers to create narratives and make performance judgements. The consequence of the MDGs has been to over-simplify the idea of development and foster a policy agenda narrowly focussed on social investments that neglected important objectives such as inequality, climate change and democratic governance that are central development challenges.

Third, a more participatory process of formulating the global goals is needed to create a consensus on goals that are universally relevant, not just for the least-developed countries. At the same time, the consensus on the MDGs would have been unlikely without the active involvement of the World Bank and the bilateral donors as well as UNDP. The MDGs were unusual in involving the development agencies in contrast to most other goals set at the UN.

2.3 MDGs in context: the political economy of development cooperation

A review of the MDG experience would not be complete without an analysis of the politics that drove and shaped their origins, creation and application.

Origins of the MDGs: controversies over structural adjustment

In an earlier article co-authored with David Hulme (2011), I explained the motives that drove leaders of the international development community—heads of the World Bank and UN development agencies, the European development ministers and others—to create the MDGs and invest in promoting them. To summarize, their creation was motivated by the need to forge a united community to defend international development as a
global project and to reverse the declining support for development aid. During the 1980s and 1990s, the development community was divided by sharp controversies over the structural adjustment lending programs of the World Bank and IMF that were conditioned on the adoption of Washington Consensus policy reforms. These controversies pitted the NGOs and academics against the World Bank and IMF, but also involved UN agencies such as UNICEF and some stakeholders within national governments, which advocated alternatives. Moreover, development agencies became internally divided as individuals took divergent positions. The MDGs-poverty narrative could help unify this divided community, since no one could argue against ending poverty as a moral concern. It was particularly important for the UN leadership and the development ministers of major bilateral donor countries to put an end to these controversies, because they faced declining support for international development within their respective constituencies. With the end of the cold war, the geo-political interests no longer sustained support for aid budgets.

These motivations led bilateral donors to introduce the International Development Goals (IDGs), a list of six quantitative goals with timeframes for achievement, in three areas: economic well-being, social development, and environmental sustainability and regeneration (OECD, 1996). As Colin Bradford of the United States delegation explained, it was important to tell a story of aid that spoke directly to conditions of people’s lives to win over the “parliaments and publics”.13

The IDGs were effective in articulating the meaning of international cooperation for development and had gained traction in raising awareness in the donor countries. They were a concrete articulation of a consensus donor vision of development published in the 1996 statement of the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD (OECD DAC, 1996) entitled Shaping the 21st Century: Contribution of Development Cooperation. The statement gave three reasons why rich countries should support development: the humanitarian purpose of ending dire dehumanizing poverty; enlightened self interest in a world free of threats of terrorism, global disease, political instability, and uncontrolled migration; and solidarity for joint action to solve common challenges such as environmental sustainability. This vision contrasts with the agenda that emerged from the UN development conferences of the 1990s which gave considerable attention to the need for structural transformation of the economies of developing countries.

The IDGs developed considerable traction and demonstrated the effectiveness of a simple list of concrete goals to communicate a compelling story
of development. They had already begun to pay off as the secular decline in aid commitments began to be reversed. The World Bank and UN agencies began to support them and, in 2000, published a joint document monitoring their progress using the IDG framework. They inspired the UN to include goals in the Millennium Declaration. But the IDGs could not be “owned” by all stakeholders since they were invented by the bilateral donors.\textsuperscript{14} The MDGs built on the IDGs to forge a broader consensus, including the Bretton Woods institutions, UN agencies and national governments.

The MDGs could build a narrative behind which dissenting stakeholders could stand united and argue for development aid. For example, Lord Mark Malloch Brown, then UNDP Administrator, who played a central role in moving to build the Millennium Declaration into the MDGs and to create an implementation plan, recounts the view that the MDGs could bridge the divide between the UN and the World Bank over structural adjustment.\textsuperscript{15} The consensus on the MDGs can be attributed precisely to the fact that they allowed the protagonists from the 1980s and 1990s—IMF, World Bank, US Treasury, UNICEF, NGO networks, and academics on both sides of the issue—to exchange views over structural adjustment and to agree on the purpose of development while disagreeing on the means. It allowed bilateral development ministers, who needed to retain the support of all of these stakeholders, to sidestep the dilemma. Still, why did the developing countries buy into the Millennium Declaration that included the global goals? Ambassador Rosenthal of Guatemala, who was one of leading figures in coordinating the negotiations, explains that the priority for the developing countries was to keep the development issue a high priority on the UN agenda, on par with the political issues.\textsuperscript{16}

\textit{The post-2000 aid architecture: new narrative, new instruments, old policies}

The divisions over structural adjustment programmes centred around the issues of conditionality as an aid modality, liberalization and privatisation as economic growth strategies, while the social dimensions of the process focussed primarily on the consequences of fiscal austerity and stabilization measures on the poor and the vulnerable and on social investments. While economic arguments over macroeconomic policy choices drove the controversies, the social dimensions commanded a moral high ground. In this context, the narrative of poverty as the overarching purpose of international development provided a way out for all sides
of the controversies. Consensus could be reached on the ends without resolving differences over the means. It is therefore not surprising that the Millennium Declaration and MDGs define the ends, but not the means. As a consequence, the Washington Consensus policies did not disappear, but continued as a part of a broader agenda behind the headline of the MDGs. It is also not surprising that the last decade has seen little from the World Bank by way of new proposals and new policy strategies to foster economic growth combined with social justice that addresses poverty, inequality and the fulfilment of human rights.

MDGs are thus a key feature of the new aid architecture that was put in place in the late 1990s. The MDG narrative justifies aid on humanitarian grounds. The consensus defines the relationship between donors and recipients as a partnership, constructed in pursuit of a shared commitment to end poverty. For this purpose, donors would support national strategies that would integrate the MDGs and be elaborated in the national Poverty Reduction Strategy papers (PRSPs). The partnership is to be guided by principles of mutual accountability and respect for national ownership. Donor support would be provided to implement the PRSPs through the IMF new Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) along with other multilateral and bilateral support and debt relief under the Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) debt reduction initiative.

These elements, introduced towards the end of the 1990s, replaced the controversial structural adjustment lending programs of the 1980s while also retaining their core policy elements and instruments. The PRSPs and the Poverty Reduction Growth Facility (PRGF) replaced the Policy Framework Papers that spelled national policy agendas, including key economic policy reform measures. While these reform agendas are not found consistently in the PRSPs, they are included in the PRGF and HIPC agreements and condition the release of financing under these arrangements. The principles of ownership and mutual accountability expressed in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness would guide partnership between donors and the developing country governments. But the policy space for aid-dependent countries remains limited under financing conditionalities. The underlying economic development strategies continue to be driven by the Washington Consensus agenda aimed at macroeconomic stabilization and liberalization. To this end, the MDGs added a basic needs agenda, emphasizing priorities for social investments and commitments for partnership.
2.4 Global goals after 2015

New directions

While the MDGs will expire in 2015, the promises of the Millennium Declaration remain unrealized, and the extent of global poverty and the slow pace of progress remain unacceptable in today’s world of prosperity. The benefits of global economic integration have been as unevenly distributed since 2000 as in the previous decade—the gaps between the rich and poor within and between countries remain considerable.

It may be argued that global goals would not be worth setting after 2015, because the MDGs did not have adequate impact on shifting policy. Nonetheless, the MDGs have demonstrated the power of global goals and the value of comprehensive development goals in raising awareness, maintaining political support for development, and in coordinating policy debates. Without the MDGs, it is likely that the Millennium Declaration would have been shelved soon after its adoption along with numerous other decisions by the General Assembly. For these reasons, new global goals should be set to advance the implementation of the Millennium Declaration, but they need to be pursued with the institutional weight of the UN Secretary-General and with the UN investing in efforts to promote and mobilize support for them. The UN has set many global goals since the 1960s, but none has had the reach—or the investment—of the MDGs.

What should be in the new goals? The expiry of the MDGs in 2015 presents an opportunity to correct the deficiencies of the current list and emphasize new priorities, which are becoming clearer as the 21st century advances. It is also an opportunity to build goals consistent with their function as normative instruments to promote inclusive and equitable development, rooted in the ethical commitments of the Millennium Declaration.

Ethical commitments of the Millennium Declaration: shared values, human rights and the UN development agenda

In setting out a vision of the 21st century, the Millennium Declaration expresses shared social objectives based on universal values. The first chapter of the Declaration states that the following “fundamental values to be essential to international relations in the twenty-first century” (United Nations, 2000: paragraph 1): freedom, equality, solidarity, tolerance, respect
for nature, and shared responsibility. The Declaration commits governments to pursue a particular pattern of growth and development—one that is equitable and human rights based. The core theme of equality is articulated throughout the document and reflects not only equality within countries, but also between countries. This includes gender equality (paragraph 6), equitable and non-discriminatory trading and financial systems (paragraph 13), with special attention to the poorest and vulnerable people (chapter 6) and the needs of Africa that face multiple challenges (chapter 7). And most importantly, it includes the ideal of inclusive globalization, the central theme which is articulated in paragraph 5 as follows: “We believe that the central challenge we face today is to ensure that globalization becomes a positive force for all the world’s people. For, while globalization offers great opportunities, at present its benefits are very unevenly shared, while its costs are unevenly distributed.”

**Human rights principles**

The ethical framework of the document derives from the consensus international norms set out in the UN Charter that have evolved over the decades and been codified in international law. The framework goes beyond the economic concept of development “with equity” and seeks a world that is not only more peaceful and prosperous but “just” (paragraph 1). It draws explicitly on international human rights norms and principles, which are reflected throughout the document; to the core principle of “human dignity and freedom, equality and equity” (paragraph 1), the respect for economic, social, cultural, civil and political rights (paragraph 25). It reaffirms commitment to the UN Charter (paragraph 1), the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (paragraph 25), to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (paragraph 25), and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (paragraph 26). Interestingly, it also refers to the right to development (paragraph 24), the only international human rights concept that addresses development as a process.

The 1986 Declaration on the Right to Development affirms development as a fundamental human right, and is important for two reasons. First, it defines development as a “constant improvement in the well being of individuals” (UN 1986, Preamble). Second, it articulates responsibilities for development as involving not only individual, but collective actions of states. It not only states desirable development objectives, but also the obligations of states: “as leaders we have a duty therefore to all the world’s
people, especially the most vulnerable” (paragraph 2). The Declaration commits to strengthen international cooperation (paragraph 26).

For these reasons, the development strategy that the Declaration commits to is “human rights based”, characterized by the realization of all human rights (economic, social, cultural, civil and political) as its objective; the well being of the individual as the focus and unit of assessment; the application of core principles of equality and non-discrimination, empowerment and participation in the development process; and rooted in the norms of international human rights law. This contrasts with the concept of development that focuses more narrowly on economic growth and the improvement of living conditions, including meeting basic (material) needs. This conceptual framework for evaluating the development process is closely related to and overlaps significantly with the capability approach to development, or human development, which is based on the concept of development as expansion of the capability of individuals to lead lives they value developed by Amartya Sen.18

The UN development agenda

These ethical values, and the theme of human centred, equitable and sustainable development, have been reflected in the origins of the Millennium Declaration and MDGs in the UN conferences on topics ranging from environment to children to habitat held throughout the 1990s. The Internationally Agreed Development Goals (IADGs) and the UN Development Agenda are comprised of the full set of goals emerging from the 34 summits and conferences held up to 2005.

Taking place in an era of active debates about structural adjustment and liberalization, these conferences were particularly concerned with the consequences of this policy shift on poor people and poor countries. These meetings raised the common concern that reflected a strong voice of civil society and developing country governments19 that the benefits of globalization were not broadly shared. The major commitments of these conferences were combined in a single package in the 2000 Millennium Declaration, while the MDGs are a select list from the broader list.

As highlighted in the UN retrospective of the 1990s conferences, The United Nations Development Agenda: Development for All (UN DESA, 2007, p. iii), the resulting UN development agenda is strongly embedded in the UN ethical values and fundamental purpose, namely, human freedom and dignity, solidarity and burden-sharing, equality, and tolerance, and can be
seen as a concrete means to implement the UN Charter. According to José Antonio Ocampo, “Two elements have permeated the content and character of the Agenda since its inception. First, a fundamental concern for equity and for equality of all persons, as human beings and as citizens... [T]he second essential element [is] partnership. The conference process has engaged all the key stakeholders: governments, United Nations system organizations, other intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, civil society, and the private sector” (UN DESA 2007, Preface, p. iii).

**Setting new goals, measuring progress**

Like the MDGs, the purpose of the goals, targets and indicators beyond 2015 would be to harmonize reporting and to facilitate monitoring of progress towards the achievement of the Millennium Declaration. But a new approach is needed to setting the goals, targets and indicators. First, in order to redefine progress in alignment with the Declaration’s vision of development as inclusive, equitable and sustainable, the scope must expand beyond the current focus on poverty and chapter 3 (development and poverty eradication). It should also reflect chapter 1 (values and principles) and acknowledge the important ways in which development and poverty eradication are intertwined with the challenges of peace and security (chapter 2), environment (chapter 3), human rights, democracy and good governance (chapter 4). Moreover, goal setting should be framed with a methodological coherence. Finally, the new approach should include some critical means as well as ends that consider the drawbacks of the MDGs.

**Evaluating progress in human well-being**

The new approach to setting goals should also build on a coherent framework in development thinking about the nature of progress and what we have learned from development economics research in the 1990s. The following considerations are worth highlighting.

First, the multidimensionality of human well-being needs to be fully acknowledged. The work of Amartya Sen is particularly helpful in defining progress as the expansion of capabilities and freedoms—or human development approach—and in emphasizing the multidimensionality of essential instrumental freedoms to encompass economic facilities, social opportunities, political freedoms, transparency guarantees and security (Sen, 1999). Sen’s capabilities approach to development is closely related to human rights-based development and essential capabilities overlap
considerably with the core human rights, including economic, social, cultural, civil and political areas (Sen, 1999; Vizard, et al. 2011).

Second, there is need for protection against downside risks. The work on human security (Ogata and Sen, 2003; UNDP, 1994) and on vulnerability and poverty (World Bank, 2000) has highlighted the importance of protection from threats of sudden changes in core life conditions. The recent crises in global financial, fuel and food markets have highlighted these threats as important challenges of the 21st century as global market integration proceeds, exposing the risks of instability and its contagious effects across countries.

Third, sustainability must be considered and addressed. The threats to sustainability arising from environmental deterioration have become acute with the advent of global warming. Sustainability is an overriding challenge, where failure is likely to threaten all dimensions of human development, and requires major shifts in policy as well as in international cooperation.

Fourth, there is need to pursue equality of opportunities and rights. For all the reasons already elaborated, equality is a principle that is central to the normative framework of the Millennium Declaration. In practical terms, policy strategies that respect equality provide for equality of opportunity and non-discrimination in the fulfillment of human rights.

Fifth, the international environment for development and the role of “partners” needs to be clearly articulated. They should also be made more concrete than Goal 8 and broadened to incorporate objectives of stable market environment necessary for human security, and agendas for systemic reform consistent with the principles of democracy and equity.

Sixth, while goals should be set as targets to be achieved globally, countries should be encouraged to adapt the goals to their national contexts, through a process of democratic consultation. Without such adaptation, the goals are both biased against countries with low starting points and under-ambitious for those with high starting points. They would distort not only government priorities, but also the efforts of civil society to hold authorities accountable for their development performance. Previous global goals set by the UN followed this approach, and the MDGs were the first goals whose applicability to country levels was left ambiguous.

Seventh, goal setting should involve a participatory process of consultations with national Governments worldwide, and with civil society organizations at national, regional and global levels. The MDGs drew on the goals already adopted by the UN development conferences that had involved widespread consultation among civil society and government
in the national and regional preparatory conferences. In the absence of such process, it is all the more important to set in place a process of broad consultations at national, regional and global levels. The implementation process will be as important as the composition of the goals; the new goals should build on the increasing use of the MDGs by civil society to demand more of government. Furthermore, formal structures would strengthen accountability. At the national level, one approach would be to set up national commissions that would work out the implications of policy goals, and monitor implementation.

Finally, the new goals should apply not only to developing countries, but to all countries, since human poverty, inequality and exclusion are challenges facing developed countries as well.

2.5 Concluding Remarks

The recent history of the MDGs reveals much about the history of development thinking and agendas in the first decade of the 21st century. It highlights the advent of development reconceptualized as poverty reduction, opening up to a concept applicable regardless of the stage of industrialization and diversification, and levels of income and technological capacity. It further underscores the role of ideas in shaping political support for development locally and globally as well as in shifting economic and social policies.

The MDGs were the first comprehensive development goals and were effective in drawing attention to poverty eradication as a global norm and priority, and provided a common framework for debate and action. They encouraged and, no doubt, contributed to, greater support for social investments in sub-Saharan Africa, but did not lead to changes in policy strategies or to addressing systemic issues that create unequal opportunities for people and countries.

The corollary to these policy trends has been the failure to address the systemic problems of protecting developing countries from the negative consequences of global market integration. More specifically, international cooperation to protect the poor against the consequences of climate change and the crises of global financial, fuel and food markets has been wholly inadequate. Seen in this light, the MDGs could arguably have provided a convenient cover behind which the economic model of the 1990s could be pursued. The MDGs perhaps co-opted the language of human development, and the social impact of adjustment while defanging critical debates about the impact of the liberalization agendas on poverty and inequality. The need
for alternative macroeconomic policies that would favour distribution, job creation for the unskilled, and reduce inequality no longer resonates with policymakers as urgent issues.

The impact of the MDGs brings home the importance of narratives, and the power of quantitative indicators as a communications tool that can have far-reaching impacts. It is also a lesson in how reshaping the definition of terms can have positive and perverse consequences. The ability of the term “MDGs” to frame international development policy debates—and the concept’s staying power and reach—can only be explained by the power of numbers to communicate complex ideas by simplification, abstract ethical values by reification, and to convey (misplaced) scientific precision and certitude. By contrast, the definition of development is ambiguous and fraught with controversies over definitions, measurement and strategies. What’s more, the process of development is complex—involving human creativity and effort, social cooperation and mobilization, economic investments and political commitments—and the challenges are multidimensional and location-specific, often requiring high-risk solutions. Quantification renders such complexity into a set of numbers, intangible factors into concrete goods and outcomes, and risk-prone processes into a predictable technological solution. But sociologists who study indicators as “technologies of governance” go even further, pointing out that quantification is “not merely a strategy for describing the social and natural worlds, but a means of reconfiguring them. It entails the imposition of new meanings and the disappearance of old ones” (Porter, 1994: 338).

Indeed, the MDG experience highlights the difficulty of translating ethical norms as expressed in the Millennium Declaration into international policymaking. The MDGs were powerful and convincing to “the parliaments and publics” around the world because they conveyed a compelling case for ending poverty as an ethical priority. Yet ethical norms and principles are not strategies for changing policy behaviour. Thus, development professionals set about implementing the Millennium Declaration by interpreting the MDGs as if they were technocratic economic policy tools. Entrenched in the tradition of a “positivist” science driven by quantification and evidence, they incorporated only chapter 3 of the 8 chapters of the Declaration in the MDGs, picking out those objectives which were measurable and for which data were available. The ethical principles laid out in chapter 1 of the Declaration were forgotten in the spirit of “only what can be counted counts”.

By articulating the complex challenges of development in eight goals and concrete targets for 2015, the MDGs have drawn unprecedented
attention to poverty as an urgent global priority. But the simplification and quantification reduced the development agenda to meeting basic material needs and stripped of the Millennium Declaration’s vision for development with social justice and human rights. It effectively left out mention of equity, empowerment of people, sustainability, and building sustainable productive capacity for economic growth. The simplified narrative has no room for understanding poverty as related to the underlying power relations within and between countries and the asymmetries in the global economy. It leaves little room for addressing issues that have long been on the agenda of developing countries, such as their lack of voice in international economic negotiations—at the World Bank, the World Trade Organization and other institutions of global governance. It also remains silent on the issues that have long been on the agenda of critics of standard macroeconomic frameworks for their distributional consequences. The new global goals thus need to redress these shortcomings and find a way to use the power of numbers to recapture the ethical principles and norms of the Millennium Declaration.
I am grateful for comments from the workshop on Alternative Strategies for the Post-2015 Era held at the UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre in Florence, Italy on 7-8 December 2011, particularly the comments by Ana Cortez and Jose Antonio Alonso. The paper draws on collaborative work with Frances Stewart on the Report of the UN Committee for Development Policy on its fourteenth plenary session to the Economic and Social Council, and with Joshua Greenstein on MDG progress measurement. The usual caveats apply.

In 2005 the list was expanded to include 21 targets and 60 indicators.

For example, initially many NGOs were hesitant to espouse the MDGs because they did not agree with the list of goals, targets and indicators or objected to the lack of adequate consultation in the way they were drawn up, or because they replaced agendas that they were pursuing. But over time, they have become more broadly accepted and some of the initial critics have begun to use them as the consensus framework for development efforts. For example, the human rights community initially ignored or criticized them (Alston, 2005) but changed course and adopted a more constructive approach to use the MDGs to pursue a human rights and development agenda (OHCHR, 2008).

The MDG narrative meets the criteria of a norm that has become well established according to the trajectory of international norm dynamics elaborated by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998). Norms emerge, then cascade, and then reach the final stage of becoming “institutionalized”. At this stage, norms take on “a taken-for-granted quality and are no longer a matter of broad public debate” (p. 9). The mechanisms that keep the norm alive at this stage are “habit” and “institutionalization”. The main actors are the professions and bureaucracy who uphold and adhere to the norm in order to conform to a recognized standard. In contrast, it is the idealistically committed “norm entrepreneurs” who drive the emergence of a norm, and states and organizations that promote its “cascade”. See Fukuda-Parr and Hulme (2010).

“Human poverty” was introduced by the 1997 UNDP Human Development Report and refers to multiple capability deprivations (UNDP, 1997).

See Stewart and others (2007) for a detailed review of alternative definitions and measures of poverty.

PRSPs are prepared by governments of low-income countries and serve as a framework for reaching agreement with the donors on development priorities and financing requirements. The study included all “second generation” PRSPs existing at the time of the study.

The MDGs are associated with dramatic increases in aid funding for social investments, but this is continuation of a trend that started prior to the introduction of the MDGs. If there is causation, we might ask if donor policies drove the MDGs rather than the other way round.

The United States doubled aid to sub-Saharan Africa between 2004 and 2009, one year ahead of the pledge; Canada doubled funding from 2001 levels; Norway surpassed the pledge to maintain ODA at 1 per cent of GNI, and Switzerland increased its ODA to 0.41 per cent of GNI.

See, for example, the 2005 World Bank study: Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning from a Decade of Reforms. While such studies take a critical view of the policy approaches of the 1980s and 1990s, and introduce new perspectives that focus particularly on the role of institutions and the diversity of country conditions, they...
are focused on growth rather than on poverty, and do not challenge the fundamental economic strategy.

11 The annual progress reports report global and regional aggregates. Country progress is tracked in the on-line system that also rates whether or not countries are on track to achieving the 2015 targets: http://www.mdgmonitor.org, accessed 28 January 2012.

12 Interviews with John Ruggie, former Assistant Secretary General in the Office of the Secretary-General, 6 August 2008, Cambridge Massachusetts; with Andy Mack, former Director in the Office of the Secretary-General, 11 September 2008 by telephone. Ruggie and Mack were principal authors of the Secretary-General’s report, We the Peoples to the General Assembly. The last chapter of this report was transformed, with modifications, into the text of the Millennium Declaration.


14 This was patently apparent when the NGO community vigorously protested the UN Secretary General joining the World Bank and the OECD in signing the 2000 progress document, Better World For All http://paris21.org/sites/default/files/bwa_e.pdf accessed 29 January 2012.


18 Both Sen (2004; 2011) and Nussbaum (2011) have written about the close connection between capabilities and rights. See also the 2000 Human Development Report (UNDP, 2000) that explores the theoretical overlaps between capabilities and rights, and the policy implications for development. See also Vizard and others (2011).

19 These conferences were also noteworthy for their unusually open processes (UN DESA, 2007). Unlike most UN debates that involve only governments, these conferences opened up to broader involvement of civil society groups. They were involved in the preparatory meetings organized by national governments and UN agencies at country and regional levels. Civil society groups were often included in official national delegations and involved in inter-governmental negotiations.

20 I refer to human security as vulnerability threats from political and other types of violence, natural disasters, disease, environmental degradation, hunger, unemployment and economic downturn. The concept has become increasingly used in the academic and policy literature but with divergent definitions. They range from a narrow conception focussing on threats from political oppression and war—or “freedom from fear”—to a broad conception that encompasses all sources of threats including “freedom from want”. While the concept continues to be contested amongst academics, recent debates in the UN have converged on using the term human security in the broad perspective. See United Nations (2010). Human Security, Report of the Secretary General, 8 March 2010 (A/64/701).
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